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Abstract 
The next generation of smart cards will be used for services where security is a key issue. 
Reliability and trust are necessary for a large scale adoption and success of these smart cards. 
New validation techniques are needed, based on well-defined mathematical models, using 
special tools for mathematically proving correctness, going well beyond testing. A EU-funded 
consortium 'VERIFICARD' of 5 academic and 2 industrial partners, coordinated by Nijmegen, 
will work on the correctness of crucial components of the chosen (JAVACARD) platform and 
of individual applications. This brief note will give an introduction to smart cards and their 
importance in computer science today. Additionally, it will give an impression of the work 
done in Nijmegen on these topics. 
1 Introduction 
Smart cards are small devices carrying a computer chip . They come in various shapes: plastic 
cards in the form of credit cards (used as, for instance, electronic purses) or SIM-cards in mobile 
telephones. 
The next generation of smart cards will be used for services where security is a key issue, like au-
thenticated access to computer networks, e-cornmerce, rn-commerce, high value wire-less (GSM-
or UMTS-based) services, loyalty programs and digital signing. The correct functioning of these 
cards must be absolutely guaranteed. Potentially malicious application programs must be iden-
tified. A virus on a smart card is a nightmare scenario. Therefore, new validation techniques 
are needed, based on well-defined mathematical models, using special tools (theorem provers and 
model checkers) for mathematically proving correctness, going well beyond testing. 
•From: Newsletter 5 of the Dutch Association for Theoretical Computer Science (NVTI), 2001. 
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This offers both a challenge and an opportunity to the field of formal methods in general, and 
of JAVA-program verification in particular, as the leading smart card platform- JAVACARD- is 
based on JAVA. The challenge is to show that formal verification techniques are applicable to 
practical programs, in a real-life context, and thus may develop from an academic discipline into 
an industrially relevant field. The opportunity follows from the fact that smart cards are still 
small enough to bring their software within the reach of modern verification tools . 
This is a very important point. The formalization, specification and verification of the JAVA CARD 
platform is certainly not a trivial task, yet the platform is small enough to make a complete formal 
treatment feasible. Moreover, since smart cards are mass-produced and open to any kind of attack, 
the smart card industry as well as the card issuers have a profound interest in an error-free and 
secure implementation of the platform and its applets . This makes JAVACARD a unique chance for 
formal methods to prove their importance for the software industry. For a comprehensive overview 
of applications of formal methods to JAVACARD and smart cards, see [HarOO]. 
2 JavaCard 
Smart cards contain a microprocessor chip which can execute small application programs called 
applets. The cards that are in use today feature a single applet, written in machine code, which 
is 'burnt' in ROM and therefore fixed forever. In contrast, the new generation of smart cards can 
hold several applets in their memory at the same time ("multi-application"), and new applets can 
be downloaded after the cards have been issued ("post-issuance"), allowing services to be updated 
or new services to be added without replacing the card. Moreover, applets are not written in 
machine code specific to the particular chip used, but are written in a high-level language which 
is compiled to byte code that is interpreted by a virtual machine on the smart card. 
The amount of memory available on smart cards is rather restricted, typically in the order of 
10 kilobytes. It consists of a ROM containing a run-time environment, persistent updateable 
memory (such as EEPROM) for information which has to be preserved when power is removed, 
and transient memory for temporary workspace. 
A card is used by inserting it in (or bringing it sufficiently close to) a smart card reader. This 
smart card reader will generally be an input/output device of some computer system, which 
communicates with the card's system by exchanging byte sequences called Application Protocol 
Data Units (APDUs) . An APDU may contain an order to select a certain applet, or an order for 
the currently selected applet. The card responds with APDUs containing results, error messages, 
etc. This and other aspects of smart cards are standardized in ISO 7816. 
Applets are written in a high level language and are designed to run on a standardized open 
platform. The applets for smart cards can be programmed in a language JAVACARD, which is a 
simplified version of the popular language JAVA. JAVACARD, like JAVA, is owned by Sun, but is 
freely available and described in open standards. 
There are currently three standards for smart cards: JAVACARD1 , MultOS, and Windows for 
Smart Cards. JAvACARD is the most open standard, with its specifications publicly and freely 
available. All currently operational implementations of multi-application cards use the JAVA-
CARD platform, and all major players in the smart card market are producing JAVACARD-based 
products. MultOS is slowly moving in the direction of JAVACARD. Windows for Smart Cards is 
developed by Microsoft . Altogether, the choice for JAVACARD seems obvious. 
The JAvACARD language is a subset of JAVA developed with the limited memory and computation 
power of smart cards in mind. For instance, it only supports the types byte, short , a.nd optionally 
int with their basic operations , but not double and float , and only allows one-dimensional arrays. 
1 See the URL of the JAVA CARD Forum http: //ww. j avacardforum. org 
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It supports most control flow constructs, as well as exception throwing and catching. However, 
its Application Programming Interface (API) is quite small, see below. 
The source code of a JAVACARD applet is translated into byte code by a standard JAVA compiler. 
The resulting byte code is checked by a byte code verifier· to verify certain properties related to 
e.g. typing, and to see that the applet only uses features supported by JAVACARD. Since JAVA 
byte code contains redundant information (which for instance enables full reverse-compilation), 
and JAVACARD applets should be as small as possible, the byte code is further converted by a cap 
converter into a Converted Applet (CAP-file), which is the form loaded and installed on the card. 
JAVA JAVA CAP file 
source compiler byte code converter 
An applet 's CAP file is interpreted by the JAVACARD Virtual Machine (JCVM). The JCVM 
resides in the card's ROM, together with the JAVACARD Run-time Environment (JCRE) , which 
is an implementation of the JAVACARD API , and the applets which are loaded when the card is 
manufactured. One of these applets may be designed to load and install post-issuance applets into 
persistent memory. 
Applets are separated from each other by a firewall mechanism. No object created by one applet 
can be accessed by a different applet, unless such access is explicitly requested and granted, via a 
so-called shareable object. 
Whenever the card is powered-up in a card reader it is reset to a consistent state. In order to 
preserve consistency, all updates of persistent memory are subject to a begin/commit/abort-
transaction mechanism. 
Altogether, the JAvACARD API currently comprises 18 classes for exceptions, 16 interfaces for 
working with cryptographic keys and only 10 fundamental classes. Among the latter are a class 
APDU for communication with the card reader, classes PIN and OwnerPIN for working with PIN-
codes, an abstract class Applet for applets, and a class JCSystem, which contains methods for 
transaction handling and for handling requests for object sharing between applets maintaining the 
applet firewall. 
For general background information on smart cards, see [HNSSOO], and for more specific informa-
tion on JAVACARD, see [CheOO] . 
3 Formal methods for smart cards in VerifiCard 
The VERIFICARD project will work on formalization of the JAVACARD platform (mainly: what is 
on the card) and of applets , in several different ways. 
Platform specification and verification providing formal descriptions of the full JAVACARD 
smart card platform, starting from the open JAVACARD standards. This formalization in-
cludes that of the JAVACARD language, virtual machine and run-time environment (API) 
and is used to develop and formally establish the soundness of several components of the 
JAVACARD platform, in particular the byte code verifier and cap converter, and possibly 
also the compiler. It is also needed as a basis for techniques of applet verification. 
Since the existing informal specification of JAVACARD is partly given at source code level 
and partly at byte code level, the platform specification and verification will be done at both 
levels. 
At the source code level, a formal operational semantics of the JAVA CARD language and API 
will be provided, for proving the compiler correct . As an axiomatic semantics (Hoare logic) 
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is better suited to proving logical (safety) properties of applets using theorem provers, such 
a semantics is provided as well. The soundness and completeness of the axiomatic semantics 
w.r.t. the operational one will be proved . 
At the byte code level, a formalization of the JCVM will be provided, and in doing so, 
a formal operational semantics of JAVA byte code. This formalization will be used for a 
verification of the compiler, and the construction of a certified byte code verifier and cap 
converter. 
Applet specification and verification developing methods and tools for the validation of as-
pects of applets, in particular security aspects. The applets run on the JAVACARD platform, 
and therefore these methods need to be based on the platform formalisation. 
Different styles of specification will be explored, namely logic methods using Hoare logic and 
algorithmic methods using temporal logic, in order to investigate the types of problems for 
which they are best suited. The case studies provided by the industrial partners will drive 
this exploration (instead of looking for problems which are well solved by a chosen method). 
The algorithmic methods will be based on an operational semantics at byte code level. A 
JAVACARD Temporal Logic Specification Language will be developed which should take 
care of typical aspects of JAVACARD like object sharing and firewalls, transactions, tran-
sient objects, etc. Three techniques for the verification of such aspects will be considered: 
compositional proof techniques (allowing to specify and verify applets individually), abstract 
interpretation and model checking. 
The logic methods will be based on an axiomatic semantics at source code level. A JAVA-
CARD Interface Specification Language will be developed which is similar to a subset of 
JML described below. Three approaches to verification are investigated: verification at the 
syntactic level and at the semantic level, the latter with and without using a representation 
of the global object store. For verification at the semantic level applets are translated into 
the logic of some theorem prover, using the LOOP-tool described below. 
Applications applying and testing the techniques developed in the other parts, in particular 
using realistic case studies supplied by industrial partners and members of the End-User 
Panel. 
In particular a banking case study and a mobile communication (GSM) case study will 
be developed which will include examples of hostile applets to be detected as such by the 
methods and tools developed earlier . Also, a set of security properties will be provided 
which are to be verified by these methods and tools . As a further application, the API will 
be verified using the specification developed earlier. 
In the project 5 academic and 2 industrial partners participate. The academic partners are the 
University of Nijmegen (the project coordinator), INRIA in France, the Technical University of 
Munich, the University of Hagen in Germany and SICS, the Swedish Institute of Computer Science. 
The industrial partners are the French companies Gemplus and Bull, who are both deeply involved 
in the development of (JAVACARD) smart cards. 
The project also has an End User Panel representing different industries with an interest in 
smart card security. The End User Panel currently consists of TNO (The Netherlands), Deutsche 
Telekom, France Telecom, Setec Oy (Finland), Trusted Logic (France), IBM Zurich, INTEGRI 
(Belgium) and Ericsson (Sweden). 
At source code level, Munich will work on the operational and axiomatic semantics of JAVACARD. 
Nijmegen and Hagen will develop a complete formal specification of the JAVACARD API, which 
ideally should become a standard reference. All this will form the basis for the specification and 
verification of JAVACARD applets at source code level using theorem provers by Nijmegen, Hagen, 
and INRIA. Here Nijrnegen will use the LOOP-tool- discussed in more detail below -, Hagen will 
use the Jive tool developed there, and INRIA will use Coq. 
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At byte code level, INRIA, Munich, and Gemplus will work on formalisation of the JAVACARD 
virtual machine and a certified byte code verifier. INRlA will also develop a certified cap-converter, 
and Munich will start work on a certified compiler. The formalisation of the virtual machine 
will be used by INRIA and SICS for verification of JAVACARD applets at byte code level using 
modelchecking, abstract interpretation, and compositional proof techniques. 
4 The Java Modelling Language ( JML) 
Since new applets can be downloaded to the new generation of cards, card issuers are very worried 
about controlling which applets are allowed on their cards. They can use digital signatures to 
ensure that only applets that they signed can be installed. But this leaves them with the problem 
that they want to know for sure that their applets behave correctly. This leads to old-fashioned 
program verification, which, these days, is done with modern (verification) tools and formal spec-
ification languages. This is the topic that Nijrnegen (and also Hagen and INRIA) will work on 
within the VERIFICARD consortium. 
The LOOP-group in Nijmegen (see [Loop]) uses the behavioural specification language for Java 
called JML [LBR99b, LBR99a]. JML is designed primarily by Gary Leavens in cooperation with 
Compaq SRC and Nijrnegen. We give a brief account of its features without going into any detail. 
JML is designed to specify the behaviour of JAVA classes and interfaces and their objects. The 
basic idea is that pre- and postconditions be specified for each method of a class, and an invariant 
for the class as a whole, which describes properties of the class' fields, but may be considered as 
an additional pre- and postcondition for the class' methods. 
One may specify several 'behaviours' for a method. Each behaviour has a precondition given as a 
requires-clause and a postcondition given as an ensures-clause. A behaviour may have additional 
clauses , like a modifiable-clause which specifies (non-local) variables which may be changed in 
that behaviour, or a signals-clause with a condition, which indicates that the behaviour may 
result in throwing an exception when that condition holds. A behaviour may be qualified as 
'normal', in which case it should return normally, or 'exceptional', in which case it should signal 
an exception. JML knows many other qualifying modifiers. 
The invariants and pre- and postconditions are written as (Boolean) expressions in standard 
JAVA-syntax, extended with various constructs like forall and exists. The reason for choosing 
standard syntax is to encourage JAVA-programmers to specify their code as they write it. Exten-
sions include quantifiers and set comprehension, logical implication, a pseudo-variable \result 
indicating a method's returned value, and more such pseudo-variables and pseudo-operators like 
\old: the pre-value of a modifiable variable v may be referred to in postconditions as \old(v). 
A specification may use model fields, i.e. specification-only variables, e.g. to capture implicit 
variables whose values could be inferred from explicit JAVA variables. The initial value of such 
model fields may be specified. A specification may also directly call methods of 'pure' classes, i.e. 
without side effects. This allows for the abstraction of (mathematical) details in a JAVA setting. 
Specifications are written in separate files or embedded in JAVA code as special comments. 
As an example, a JML specification of a method ArrayCopy of the JAVACARD API class Util is 
given in Fig. 1. The intended behaviour of arrayCopy(src, srcOff, dest, destOff, length) 
is to copy the items from src [srcOff .. srcOff+length-1] to dest [destDff .. destOff+length-1] . 
A subtle point is the need for \old ( ... ) in the ensures clause, i.e. the postcondition, of the 
arrayCopy method. This is needed to correctly specify the behaviour in the case that aliasing 
occurs, i.e. the case that src == dest. We have to refer to the original entries of the src array 
in the postcondition. The informal (javadoc) specifications of the JAVACARD API explicitly state 
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behavior 
requires: 
modifiable: 
src != null && srcOff >= 0 && 
srcOff+length <= src.length && 
dest !=null && destOff >= 0 && 
destOff+length <= dest.length && 
length >= 0; 
dest[destOff .. destOff+length-1], 
TransactionException.systeminstance.reason; 
~ ensures: \forall (short i) 0 <= i && i < length 
~ ==> dest[destOff+i] == \old(src[srcOff+i] ) ; 
~ signals: (TransactionException e) 
~ e.getReason() == TransactionException.BUFFER_FULL; 
~*I 
public static final native short arrayCopy(byte[] src, 
short srcOff, 
byte[] dest, 
short destOff, 
short length) 
throws ArrayindexOutOfBoundsException, 
NullPointerException, 
TransactionException; 
Figure 1: JML specification for arrayCopy from Util 
that this is what happens if src and dest are aliases. 
The TransactionException that may be thrown by arrayCopy is typical for JAVACARD, and may 
arise because of the limited available resources on smart cards. It may occur when an overflow 
arises in a special transaction buffer that is used to enable rollback of operations in case of failure 
(e.g. when the card is prematurely removed from the card reader.) Further examples of JML 
specifications for classes from the JavaCard API are discussed in [PBJOO, PBJ01]. 
Specifications as those in Fig. 1 provide a basis to formally prove that a given method implemen-
tation (e.g. in an applet, possibly involving an arrayCopy) satisfies its specification. Especially 
the modifiable clauses are useful to control the side-effects that applets can have (and thus the 
possible damage that they can do). 
5 The LOOP-tool 
The LOOP-tool (where LOOP stands for Logic of Object Oriented Programming) is developed 
in Nijmegen, partly in cooperation with the Technical University of Dresden. It translates JML-
programs (i.e., JAVA programs annotated with JML-specifications as outlined above) into a de-
scription of their semantics in the higher-order logic used by the theorem provers PVS and Is-
abelle/HOL, see [BJOO]. In fact, a JAVA-class is modelled as a co-algebra [JR97, Rei95, Jac99] 
mapping a state into a sum of products of JAVA types and the state space. The theorem provers 
PVS or Isabelle/HOL can then be used that JAVA-programs meet their JML-specifications. This 
is a non-trivial, highly interactive activity for which a special tailor-made Hoare logic has been 
developed [JPOO]. The first steps in the verification of JML-annotated JAVA-programs using the 
LOOP tool are described in [BJP01]. 
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6 Summary 
The JAVACARD platform offers a unique opportunity for formal methods to show their value for 
real-life software development: the platform is non-trivial but not too large, and an error-free and 
secure implementation is of vital importance not only for the smart card industry and card issuers, 
but also for society at large. 
The VERIFICARD project aims to provide methods and tools for the complete specification and 
verification of applets written for the JAVA CARD platform used in next-generation smart cards. 
To this end the project will develop 
• a formalization of 
- the JAvACARD language at source level, by an operational semantics and an axiomatics 
semantics, and of the JAVACARD Application Programming Interface (API) 
- the JAvACARD Virtual Machine, giving an operational semantics of the JAVACARD 
byte code level 
• certified tools for developping JAVACARD programs, including 
- a byte code verifier 
- a cap converter 
- a JAVA compiler 
• methods and tools for the specification and verification of applets, at byte code level and 
source code level, using theorem proving, abstract interpretation, and model checking. 
These formalizations, specifications and verification methods will be evaluated using non-trivial 
characteristic case studies (and the reference implementation of the JAVACARD API). 
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